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Trains and boats and planes and Brexit
“Trains and boats and planes are passing by
They mean a trip to Paris or Rome
For someone else but not for me…”
Trains and boats and planes by Burt Bacharach.
Will the process of the United Kingdom resigning its membership of the Euro-
pean Union, commonly referred to as Brexit, mean the end of trips to Paris and
Rome for British citizens or at least the end of trips that are as easy and cheap
as they are at present and indeed will it be the end of easy travel to Belfast,
Cardiff, Edinburgh and London for mainland EU citizens?
Incidentally, it is clear that Mr Bacharach was not a maritime lawyer1, Commer-
cial craft that carry cargo and passengers by sea are technically “ships” or
“vessels” and not “boats” but “trains and ships and planes” is perhaps less
pleasing to the ear and Mr Bacharach certainly knew about writing songs!
Over the centuries a body of law has grown to govern transport with major
international Conventions to the fore, notably The Hague Rules, The Hague
Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules for shipping, the CMR for road transport
and the CIM for railway transport. These conventions aspire to world-wide rele-
vance but they are not perfect. In addition, within its borders, the European
Union (EU) has developed sophisticated rules for transport with particular
significance for competition, (and its connection to cost), safety and passenger
compensation for breach of obligation by the carrier. Now however, the United
Kingdom has decided to resign its membership of the EU and consequently to
remove itself from the application of the purely EU rules. This decision has
excited much attention. A major economy has never taken this step before. Can
it be achieved? What will be the consequences?
There is uncertainty compounded by diplomatic and domestic political pressure.
The referendum about whether the UK should stay or leave divided the voting
population almost equally into two camps and they offer weak justification in
support of their positions; “Remainers”, (those who have no wish to leave the
EU), say that leaving has enormous constitutional significance which should not
1 It is common to hear vessels designed to carry goods or passengers referred to as “boats” but the legal
definition, albeit a rather circular one, found in the English Merchant Shipping Acts of 1894 and 1995
refers to “vessels” and “ships” and not “boats”.
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be left to a simple vote. They say that the wording of the referendum question
was simplistic and that the process was flawed; “No-one voted for the country
to be poorer” is a frequent remark from these people although the wording on
the ballot paper was clear.
“Brexiteers”, (those who wish the UK to leave the EU) on the other hand say,
“the people have spoken” and go on to add that it would be undemocratic to
overturn the referendum decision, while seemingly forgetting that there was a
UK referendum in 1975 where the people “spoke” to remain within what was
then called the European Economic Community, (the EEC). So much for the
binding effect of referenda in the UK: the jostling and argument will continue
for some time yet.
How should the remaining 27 countries act? Will Brexit damage the EU? How
to maintain the cohesion of the EU while not losing trading and cooperative
links with the UK is a political question but these are underpinned by legal ques-
tions.
1. Why do some Britons wish to leave the EU? The economic “liberty” 
argument
This is partially explained by the fact that the twentieth century history of the
UK is markedly different to that of continental Europe. The drive for political
unity found in many countries was absent for many in the UK. The UK’s motive
in international relations has always been the national self-interest and usually
this means the facilitation of international trade. Consequently it, saw the
Common Market, (as it was when the UK joined the group) as just that, a
market; an opportunity to trade freely across national borders. The UK was
attracted by the trade possibilities rather than by a political union.
It is undeniable that while the EU is a free trade area for those within its borders
it is a protectionist bloc for those outside. The UK has long been motivated by
the desire to trade internationally and particularly on free trade terms. Certainly,
this is the case since the repeal in 1846 of UK legislation known as the Corn
Laws. These was explicitly protectionist, they raised tax barriers against foreign
goods and in particular focussed upon a staple of the diet of the poor; bread.
The legislation prevented entry into the UK of corn, (essential for bread produc-
tion) priced below 80 shillings per quarter (in weight) but allowed importation
above that sum. A move clearly designed to protect the interests of landowning
farmers and to the disadvantage of the poor.
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For the British, the issue of tax barriers is not simply fiscal or trade connected
but is directly related to liberty; a member of Parliament, Charles Villiers,
consistently made this connection. It was Villiers who became famous for his
annual motions to Parliament for repeal of the Corn Laws, which began in 1838
and continued through 18462. He made the direct connection between free trade
and liberty. In a speech to the House of Commons of the British Parliament 1838
he said:
“I will first ask what is this principle of the Corn Laws? [it is] protec-
tion to the landed interest…I dispute the justice of such a principle as
that of protection. I care not whether it applies to land or to trade. I
object to it as unjust, unless universally applied; and I say it is inca-
pable of such an application...”
Later in the speech he goes on to link free trade with liberty:
“The very principle and policy which persons are so apt to deride and
so unwilling to discuss, namely free trade – for what is this freedom, but
liberty for persons to provide, and the community to enjoy, that which
is needful and desired at the lowest cost and at the greatest advantage?
That is at once the purpose of all foreign trade, and the policy of free
trade, and that is the very ground on which we now contend, in the
name of justice and consistency, to be allowed to provide…”
It seems to some that the EU is shifting towards a comprehensive political union
as a main objective with free trade being relegated to the periphery and provided
only to those within the Union but otherwise to be protectionist to those
outside: in other words, a limitation of liberty. For some this is enough to justify
leaving the EU, but it is not the only reason; there is the wide spread view that
the EU is overly bureaucratic. It is suggested that there is some merit in this
argument. Many Remainers would hold to this view and admit that the EU
could be improved by reform in this area but that they are still prepared to stay
within the Union. For Brexiteers reform of the EU by the removal of bureau-
cracy and the move to wider free trade is impossible; the will to achieve these
things simply does not exist strongly enough amongst enough of the other EU
member countries.
2 The (unnamed) editor of “The Free Trade Speeches of the Right Hon. Charles Pelham Villiers M.P.”
published in 1883 writes in a political memoir, in effect an introduction, that “In 1815 the Corn Laws
were passed at the point of a bayonet, and their course was marked by scenes of violence resulting, on
more than one occasion, in the execution of some of those who had been driven to desperation by the
suffering they endured from want of bread”.
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So then, the UK has long been an advocate of the liberalisation of markets but
not all other EU countries appear to give this such high importance, (see in this
regard the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy,
which by their very support of industry with subsidy are anti-competitive but
also have significant support from member states). Consequently, the impetus
towards liberalisation and away from protectionism is less forceful. If true, does
this matter?
Will other competitive minded countries find it more difficult to persuade the
less so to continue to liberalise markets? The EU has individual treaties such as
those with Norway and Switzerland but has tax barriers to the rest of the world.
Is the wider EU really in favour of free trade with countries outside its home
market? The experience of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) negotiations suggests otherwise. However, in a press release
by the European Commission on 15th February 2017 President Jean-
Claude JUNCKER said:
“Today’s vote by the European Parliament is an important milestone
in the democratic process of ratification of the agreement reached
with Canada and it also allows for its provisional entry into force. As
a result, EU companies and citizens will start to reap the benefits that
the agreement offers as soon as possible. This trade deal has been
subject to an in-depth parliamentary scrutiny which reflects the
increased interest of citizens in trade policy. The intense exchanges on
CETA throughout this process are testimony to the democratic nature
of European decision making.
This progressive agreement is an opportunity to shape globalisation
together and influence the setting of global trade rules.”
Later in the same press release Cecilia MALMSTRÖM, the EU Trade Commis-
sioner is reported as saying:
“This vote is the start of a new era in EU-Canada relations – together
we are sending a strong signal today. By building bridges rather than
walls, we can face the challenges that confront our societies together.
In these uncertain times, with rising protectionism around the world,
CETA underlines our strong commitment to sustainable trade.
Canada is a close ally of Europe. We share values and ideals, and a
commitment to open markets and fair social policies.”
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So, it is a significant move towards free trade. The agreement has been made and
we are told that there is, “increased interest of citizens in trade policy” and
warned that there is “rising protectionism around the world” but it took seven
years to achieve and the increased interest in trade policy almost left the whole
agreement in tatters with the Wallonia government opposing aspects of it; oppo-
sition which was nakedly protectionist. Does the EU have the will to try to
secure free trade deals and if it truly does then does current structure of the EU
militate against the success of negotiating them?
Is the frustration at protectionist tendencies limited to the UK? Do those states
that wish for protection of significant industries in their countries form a major-
ity; is the UK somehow isolated?
Prof Simon Hix, the Harold Laski Professor of Political Science at the London
School of Economics, when commenting on data designed to see how close the
positions taken by member states are to final decisions, says not3
“The dataset contains information on 331 controversial issues on 125
pieces of EU legislation between 1996 and 2008 (i.e. several issues on
each piece of legislation). For each of these issues, [the University of
Strathclyde team which consolidated the data] …. identified the
preferred policy position of each EU government, the EU Commis-
sion, and the European Parliament. For each of these issues, the team
identified a policy scale from 0 to 100, with the most extreme actors
located at 0 and 100 and the other actors located at different points
between the extremes.
One issue, for example, concerned a controversy on a piece of legis-
lation being negotiated in 2005 on the reduction of subsidies for sugar
production. The positions ranged from stopping all subsidies (posi-
tion 0 supported by Denmark and Sweden) to keeping current levels
(position100 supported by Poland).
The UK’s position was closer to the Danish and Swedish position, as was
the outcome, which meant a substantial reduction in subsidy levels.”
Was this perhaps an unusual outcome, a rare event? Professor Hix goes on to
further comment on the 331 issues:
“Out of 29 EU actors (27 governments plus the Commission and
Parliament), the UK was on average the fourth closest actor to final
3 Commenting on Decision-Making in the European Union (DEU), a dataset put together by Robert
THOMSON, at the University of Strathclyde, and his collaborators.
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policy outcomes, and performed much better than France, Germany
and the EU commission”
So perhaps claims that the UK has been “marginalised” are overstated and its
contribution to the development of the EU not sufficiently recognised. It may
just be false perception by the British, perhaps the greater number of member
states are truly in favour of free trade. However, if this is not the case then when
the UK leaves the Union, and in doing so gives up its right to help form the
future development of the EU, the views that it might have espoused will not be
so well represented within the EU and this will be something that some remain-
ing countries might regret.
Is this the only reasons for the Referendum result?
2. Why do some Britons wish to leave? The legal sovereignty 
argument
There are two aspects to this: there is a preference for the law coming from UK
courts over that coming from the ECJ and it has been at the root of the objection
to the EU. Also, in more recent times large-scale movement of people into the
UK has caused concern.
These are major points of principle, but we intend to focus on the Brexit effect
upon transport issues; but not so much with train lines or shipping lines or
airlines but rather with the “red lines” that Governments lay down during
Brexit negotiations and which will affect transport. The UK Government in
pursuance of its negotiations says that there are issues, which cannot be compro-
mised, they are said to be points of principle; these so-called red lines. Are they?
Why are they so important?
They include a reassertion of the UK’s right to restriction entry into the country
by non-UK citizens. Currently of course, EU citizens have the right to free move-
ment to the UK. This issue is constantly seen by the UK news media as to do
with “immigration” rather than the more neutral expression, “freedom of
movement” and it has become an emotive issue in the UK but also, it should be
noted, in other EU countries too, particularly following the large-scale move-
ment of people across Europe from outside the EU notably refugees from the
war in Syria and the economic migrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and west
Africa.
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There is a long history of immigration and successful integration of nationals of
other countries into the UK. The French Huguenots, Irish Catholics and East
European Jews come most obviously to mind, but since the latter half of the
twentieth century immigration from outside of Europe has taken place and at a
level not experienced by any other country save perhaps other ex-imperial coun-
tries such as France and Belgium. The pace of immigration has not allowed for
easy absorption and integration. Some members of the existing population
appear to have felt threatened, in terms of cultural change and the competition
for employment opportunities. The expansion of the EU in recent times has led
to large numbers of EU citizens from the former Soviet countries coming to live
in the UK and this may have added to cultural concerns. It seems that the desire
to limit immigration into the country became a main relevant factor in shifting
the balance in favour of the UK leaving the EU.
At the time of the referendum, EU citizens were not the major source of immi-
gration to the UK; most immigration was from non-EU countries. There is no
EU limit upon UK governmental power to control this. The Migration Survey
Quarterly Report of February 2016 says that net migration of EU citizens into
the UK for the quarter was estimated to be 172,000 and net migration into the
UK from outside the EU was estimated to be 191,0004.
In terms of total figures, the Office for National Statistics reports that in 2016
the resident population of EU nationals in the UK was 3.6 million and of this
the largest proportion was from Poland at a figure of around 1 million.
Clearly many individuals have been prepared to come to the UK but many UK
nationals also chose to take up this benefit and to live in other EU countries.
Popular destinations for Britons are Spain, France and Ireland. The latest
governmental data available is that in 2014 there were 151,800 UK nationals
living in France5. In Spain, as of the first of January 2016 there were 296,6006.
The position with Ireland is more difficult to calculate because of the historical
free movement between the UK and Ireland but the latest data has 287,600 UK
born residents of Ireland but only 112,090 British citizens. For the purpose of
4 The Migration Statistics Quarterly Report is a summary of the latest official long-term international
migration statistics and is published by the Office for National Statistics, the Home Office and the
Department for Work and Pensions. The most recent report available to us of February 2017 shows
that 268,000 EU citizens, (this figure excludes returning UK citizens) and 257,000 non-EU citi-
zens migrated to the UK.
5 Data from the French Government census carried out by the Institut de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques (INEE).
6 Data from the Institutio Nacional de Estadistica (INE).
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this data those holding dual nationality are counted as being Irish since they
chose to live there7.
It seems that the free movement of workers benefits the UK in terms of gaining
labour and of providing opportunities for its citizens – even if this latter benefit
is not employment but a place in the sun in retirement.
A second “red line” is that the UK should not be subject to the authority of the
European Court of Justice (the ECJ). We have already alluded to this, why is it
important? Within the UK there is a respect for the competence and independ-
ence of the British courts8, but all member states of the EU will surely claim the
same for their domestic courts, (albeit that in recent times that there has been
some cause for concern that the independence of the courts of Poland is being
undermined). Is this surrender of sovereignty so important? The ECJ is clearly a
competent and respected forum.
It is hard not to think that for some people in the UK antagonism to the ECJ
stems from a confusion in their minds between the European Court of Human
Rights, (the ECHR) and the ECJ. The ECHR has for many years been an aunt
sally and the subject of criticism by sections of the print media.
What have the ECHR and the ECJ done to provoke this dislike? Perhaps it is
because both courts have the power to bind national Governments, in other
words those national Governments must obey and put into effect the decisions
of these courts.
“The European Court of Human Rights …. In almost fifty years the
Court has delivered more than 10,000 judgments. These are binding
on the countries concerned and have led governments to alter their
legislation and administrative practice in a wide range of areas.9“
One on-going source of irritation for some in the UK has been the issue as to
whether or not convicted prisoners in UK prisons should have the right to vote
in elections and referenda. It is the long-held view of consecutive British Govern-
ments that the loss of liberty involved in custodial sentences includes the loss of
the freedom to vote. This position has been criticised and has been argued before
the ECHR in a number of cases. Most notably in:
7 Data from the UK’s Office for National Statistics as of 2011.
8 It should be noted that the UK does not have one uniform legal system but two main ones; England
and Wales, which is a common law system and Scotland which derives its origin from the civil law,
and also there is that body of law that applies separately to Northern Ireland.
9 The Council of Europe at http://www.echr.coe.int.
IHT.2018.01.book  Page 161  Tuesday, May 8, 2018  11:20 AM
L A R C I E R    I H T  1 8 / 1
Tijdschrift voor Internationale Handel en Transportrecht
162
• Hirst (No.2) v. The United Kingdom in 200510;
• Greens and MT v. The United Kingdom in 201011; and
• Firth and others v. The United Kingdom in 2014.12
In the Hirst case a prisoner serving a life sentence for manslaughter claimed that
he had been disenfranchised under the UK’s Representation of the People Act
1983, Section 3 of which says:
“A convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal
institution in pursuance of his sentence [or unlawfully at large when
he would otherwise be so detained] is legally incapable of voting at
any parliamentary or local government election.”
He argued that this was unlawful and in support of this additionally claimed
that his rights under Article 3 of Protocol Number 1 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom had been denied in that
the UK practiced a “blanket ban” i.e. a total ban and that there was, “an auto-
matic and discriminate restriction on the Applicant’s right to vote.”
In Greens and MT v. The United Kingdom it was said that:
“The Court emphasises that it has clearly established, both in the
present judgment and in its judgment in Hirst, that the prevailing situ-
ation has given rise and continues to give rise to a violation of Article
3 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of every prisoner who is unable to vote
in an election to the legislature and whose ineligibility arises solely by
virtue of his status of prisoner.”
And:
“Holds that the respondent State must:
(a) bring forward, within six months of the date upon which the pres-
ent judgment becomes final, legislative proposals intended to amend
the 1983 Act and, if appropriate, the 2002 Act in a manner which is
Convention-compliant; and
(b) enact the required legislation within any such period as may be
determined by the Committee of Ministers.”
The Court’s decision was a defeat for the UK and one that was not universally
welcomed within the UK. For some people, it may be that objection is based
10 Hirst v. The United Kingdom (No 2) [2005] ECHR 68.
11 Greens and MT v. The United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 1826.
12 Firth and others v. The United Kingdom [2014] ECHR 239.
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upon a point of principle turning upon the UK’s right to exercise its sovereignty.
In other words, for those people any supra national court is objectionable.
Does this extend to any and all such supra national forum? For example, does
this attitude extend to the International Court of Justice in The Hague? This is
an UN body to which every UN member state is automatically a member.
However, because of its existence under the UN charter and the rules about
sovereignty agreed in the charter, it is possible for states to avoid the Court’s
decisions. Some states have chosen to either reserve the right in all cases to be
subject to the Court’s ruling, as in the case of the US (in 1986 following the
Court’s ruling in Nicaragua v the United States) or to partially restrict the remit
of the Court’s power, as in the case of Australia (in 2002 to withdraw in the case
of some law of the sea issues).
So, is the nub of issue the fact that the ECHR and the ECJ are able to enforce
their decisions? Possibly so, but we should note that this situation is not one
where some imperial state seeks to impose its will upon a vassal; the UK fully
takes part in both systems by sending its judges to take part in court activities.
3. The practicalities, the diplomacy and the politics
There are so many issues that will have to be faced and overcome if the UK is to
leave the EU either with access to the single market and the customs union or
outside both and on simple World Trade Organisation rules. We can indicate
areas where difficulties will arise and suggest some possible solutions. Hard
Brexit13 would give the UK freedom to negotiate bipartite treaties around the
world but in doing so will turn away from easy access to the UK’s nearest market
and a large market at that and in addition to that is the question of how long
will they will take to be achieved.
Soft Brexit will mean some acceptance of free movement of workers and some
acknowledgment of the supervision of the ECJ both, as previously mentioned,
said to be “red lines”. These then are the principled points that currently the UK
says that it will insist upon, but negotiations if they are to mean anything require
give and take so perhaps these red lines can be circumvented.
While at home the United Kingdom Government in a white paper (a consulta-
tive document) of 201714 has declared that a bill to be referred to as The Great
13 In other words where the UK leaves both the free market and the customs union and there are taxation
and regulatory matters to be checked by a formal border staffed by Government officials.
14 The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union published in February
2017.
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Repeal Bill (previously raised in Parliament in October 2016) will be brought
into law and it will repeal the European Communities Act 1972, (which gives
effect and supremacy of EU law in the UK) and it will change the body of law,
which up until that date is complete and EU compliant, into purely domestic UK
law i.e. it will mirror completely EU law at that point but henceforth may depart
from EU law and will not necessarily comply with future modification and inno-
vation in EU law and will be subject to the UK courts and not the ECJ. Conse-
quently, passenger rights to compensation for late running trains for example
would be assured but might be subject to change in the future. The point of this
is that it is said to be a technique, which allows for stability while changes are
made. It is a controversial step since as initially proposed the Government would
have power to change rules without putting these changes to Parliament and so
to pass through the normal process of scrutiny. This is a strange position for a
government that insists that leaving the EU is about regaining Parliamentary
sovereignty to take. The position as we write, is that Parliament would have a
“meaningful vote” about any proposed agreement with the EU. It is not clear
what this means, if Parliament was able to, and did, reject the plan would this
inevitably lead to a hard Brexit or could the UK stay in the EU? Has it already
lost that possibility would the remaining 27 states allow this to happen?
Also, this is a massive undertaking. A large number of these legal measures will
become irrelevant because they assume UK membership of the EU, a good
example would be the rules relating to EU Parliamentary elections. A very signif-
icant issue for us when analysing the situation of UK transport after the UK
leaves the EU is that in addition to these measures there are many laws which
refer to or acknowledge the role of EU bodies in supervising or administering
the effective working of a trade or industry; one example of such of a non-
transport body is the European Medicines Agency, which has oversight of safety
and the evaluation of medicines; clearly very important in terms of confidence.
Also, we hear recently that a UK Government minister has said that as regards
fishing in waters more than six and less than twelve nautical miles from the UK’s
coastline this may be restricted to foreign vessels and in particular may apply to
fishing vessels from the Republic of Ireland, Germany, France, Belgium and the
Netherlands. The UK would do this by withdrawing from the London Fisheries
Convention of 1964 and by giving the necessary two-year notice prescribed by
the Convention.
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The rights under the convention are:
Article 2
The coastal State has the exclusive right to fish and exclusive jurisdic-
tion in matters of fisheries within the belt of six miles measured from
the baseline of its territorial sea.
Article 3
Within the belt between six and twelve miles measured from the base-
line of the territorial sea, the right to fish shall be exercised only by
the coastal State and by such other Contracting Parties, the fishing
vessels of which have habitually fished in that belt between 1st Janu-
ary 1953 and 31st December 1962.
Withdrawal is covered by:
Article 15
The present Convention shall be of unlimited duration. However, at
any time after the expiration of a period of twenty years from the
initial entry into force of the present Convention, any Contracting
Party may denounce the Convention by giving two years’ notice in
writing to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland. The latter shall notify the denunciation to the
Contracting Parties.
Consequent upon this we presume that the UK itself is required to give the same
notice.
This would also mean that the UK would lose its automatic right to fish in the
similarly defined waters of these other states. It is argued that this Convention
has been subsumed into the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy15 and so has no legal
effect. But even if this is not a correct analysis, the two years notice of with-
drawal runs to approximately the same time as the UK’s, (at present) scheduled
date of departure from the EU and, in the absence of any negotiated settlement
providing for other measures, then the UK would leave the Common Fisheries
Policy ambit of control.
So, is this a question of tidying up loose ends for the future position, after all it
would be odd to exert control over the UK’s full Exclusive Economic Zone,
15 For an authoritative analysis of the Common Fisheries Policy see: The EC Common Fisheries Policy
by Robin CHURCHILL and Daniel OWEN, Oxford University Press 2010.
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(EEZ) right to 200 nautical miles, (where this does not conflict with the rights
of other states) and leave the belt of six to twelve nautical miles available to the
signatories to the 1964 Convention, or is it mere posturing?
These are public law matters but additionally Brexit raises important private
law sea transport issues. It is true to say that rules relating to the safe navigation
of ships, the safety of vessels themselves and of the crew on board them and the
prevention and minimisation of pollution from ships are all covered by various
internationally agreed conventions promoted by the International Maritime
Organisation (the IMO), an United Nations Agency. The IMO is responsible for
the drafting of such milestone conventions as the Safety of Life at Sea Conven-
tion, (SOLAS) and the Civil Liability and Fund conventions, (CLC and Fund)
and the EU has no role in these. Also, it is the case that Brexit will not affect the
ability of British shipowners to load and discharge cargo in EU ports and that
movement from one EU port to another i.e. cabotage16 will only affect a small
number of British companies but it will affect some and they are likely to protect
their business interests by “flagging out” i.e. by moving from the British Register
to an “Open Registry” a common enough practice but not one that is of benefit
to UK national interests.
However, the question of safety at sea does have an European dimension and
one which Brexit does have an impact on.
The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) provides valuable assistance to
European shipping with regard to safety, ship source pollution including that
from cargoes and from bunker fuel and also importantly with Port State
Control17. Currently the UK is a member of EMSA but following Brexit the UK
will have to take over total responsibility for shipping in its sphere of control;
something that is not beyond the bounds of the UK’s competence but something
that will require significant financial resources.
At present the UK contributes to the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism, which is
a method by which the EU cooperates to pool resources with which to fight and
resolve major shipping incidents and of these oil pollution is a matter of great
16 “Cabotage rights” is the alternative name to the “coasting trade”, a long-standing term in maritime
law which refers to the rights to trade between ports in the same country. It was a concept unknown
to the UK in terms of domestic law but had application within the British Empire see The Merchant
Shipping Act 1894, section 736. The term cabotage is now also used in an aviation context.
17 Port State Control refers to the ability of a commercial port to examine the legal documents of every
ship entering the port and if these are found wanting to detain the ship and in so doing to improve
safety at sea. In this regard the port takes on the role of supervision of shipping that historically lay
with the Flag State i.e. the state where the vessel is registered and whose law applies to activities on
board. Port State Control has become important in the wake of the popularity of “open registers”.
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importance. In this regard, the Agency provides oil spill response ships and has
the resources to track the location and movement of oil spills by satellite. Once
it leaves the EU the UK will have to develop this expertise for itself.
The UK’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency is the natural body to take on the
extra responsibility but particularly since cuts in its budget over the last six years
which saw the scrapping of the Maritime Incident Response Group, (a body
which had developed specialism in fighting fires at sea) and the reduction of the
number of emergency towing vessels from four to one this will be costly; it will
need a reversal of these measures. It is possible that UK Brexit negotiators will
seek to achieve associate member status of the EMSA. This will be financially
attractive and retain cooperative benefits but will likely need some UK obser-
vance of EU rules, which raises the relationship with the ECJ that will need to
be resolved.
4. The relationship between the UK and Ireland
Road and rail and the UK’s land border with the Irish Republic are also difficult
problems for the negotiating teams.
The UK is Great Britain and the islands off its coast but there is of course
another nearby island, that of Ireland, which is presently shared between that
part of the UK that is Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The two
countries have a history characterised by violence but also by mutually benefi-
cial trading.
The violence goes back at least to the invasion of Ireland by Strongbow, (Rich-
ard de Clare, Earl of Pembroke) in 1170 and continued sporadically through to
the bombings and shootings of the 1970’s and 80’s. Since the Anglo-Irish Agree-
ment brokered by the two Prime Ministers, Tony Blair and Bertie Aherne in
1998 the violence has subsided but not entirely disappeared. A major contribu-
tion to this peace has been the diplomatic support given by the EU to its two
member states. While grants and subsidies, were helpful, the existence of an
open border was crucial.
A hard border would cause problems; there significant cross border trade at
present with some being aimed at the markets in the two states but additionally
road haulage companies in Ireland routinely use the UK as a quick route to other
EU countries so road and rail transport would be affected. If the UK does leave
the union will this damage the peace between the unionist and nationalist
communities of the north of Ireland, (i.e. between those who wish there to be a
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union with Britain and those who would prefer a one nation united Irish state
for the entire island of Ireland)? As we write it is said that the parties have a
negotiated compromise but it is also said that nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed and there is much yet to be resolved.
5. Trains and boats
Ireland apart, Brexit will not have much effect on the operating of railways with
the EU since the only points of contact are between the UK and the Republic of
Ireland and the Channel Tunnel. There will be some effect upon infrastructure
with the withdrawal of funding for projects such as the HS2, (the proposed
high-speed rail link between Yorkshire and Lancashire and London). However,
this was never likely to be a significant contribution and certainly less than 10%
of the total18.
So far, we have seen that leaving a regime where there are common agreed rules
may cause delays at the borders but a more significant issue will be the regula-
tion of the forms of transport and how they operate. The main focus for lawyers
is on how the UK, when it is no longer obliged to comply with EU law and no
longer able to take advantage of EU negotiated benefits, (both with EU member
states and also with the rest of the world) will survive or to be more optimistic,
what will it do to thrive?
The first point to note is that EU law will no longer automatically regulate UK
transport, this will be for the UK itself. So how will UK law deal with this new
power? It seems to us that purely domestic issues can be easily regulated and for
those with an international element the UK will either have to secure agreement
for a pan-national adjudication panel or court or cross one of those “red lines”
and submit to the jurisdiction of the ECJ.
Secondly, for the remaining 27 countries of the EU will anything change by the
fact that the UK will leave their number? In the short term only vis-a-vis trans-
port that involves UK borders. In practice then the rail and road routes between
the UK and the Republic of Ireland, the ferry crossings with Ireland, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Denmark, the channel tunnel
crossing between the UK and France and air transport.
18 In this regard see HS2: Outline Business Case, Section 4, § 78: The financial case from the UK Depart-
ment for Transport, March 2014.
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In the longer term the UK will no longer take part in the negotiation and subse-
quent framing of future law. Does this matter to the remaining member coun-
tries? In some sense, possibly not; the majority will carry on as before, but a
change of personnel amongst the singers means a change to the sound of the
choir.
5. …and planes
There is established jurisprudence for all major forms of transport and certainly
the private law of England and Wales concerning the carriage of goods by sea
has been refined over centuries and is very detailed. The law concerning carriage
of goods and passengers by air has not had the same sustained legal scrutiny but
nonetheless, issues of air transport have developed a high degree of complexity
and we suggest that air transport is one of the main difficulties to be faced by
the Brexit negotiating teams, particularly the access to airspace and airports and
the safety of the aircraft themselves and their operation.
Regulatory bodies take the safety of air travel very seriously. Those who fail will
find themselves excluded from operating. The EU for example maintains a list
of banned airlines. Those airlines cannot operate within the EU.
The standards for safety are set by the International Civil Aviation Organisa-
tion, (an UN body) and they are then enforced by national regulators. This is
the norm for individual sovereign states but for member states of the EU this
regulation is the responsibility of the European Aviation Safety Agency, (EASA).
It should be noted that the regulations could be applied as they stand or can be
enhanced and strengthened by the national body or in the case of the EU by the
EASA. This means that the EASA oversees a common set of requirements across
the EU. The requirements include issues of approval of the types of aircraft, their
maintenance and the licensing of individual pilots. In the EU, there is further
oversight at national level; bodies such as the Civil Aviation Authority, (CAA)
in the UK in turn use these rules and requirements to regulate civil aviation in
their respective countries.
The EASA employs more than 700 aviation experts and administrators. If the
UK were to leave the EASA then it would need to reinforce the CAA or set up a
new body and to employ large numbers of similar experts and administrators
but it would also need to convince the international community of regulators
that this agency had the power to enforce high safety standards. Some of the
current EASA experts are no doubt UK nationals but not all. More will be
IHT.2018.01.book  Page 169  Tuesday, May 8, 2018  11:20 AM
L A R C I E R    I H T  1 8 / 1
Tijdschrift voor Internationale Handel en Transportrecht
170
needed so one presumes that there will be scope for the UK to welcome non-UK
nationals, some of them perhaps from the rest of the EU into the new body or is
this another red line crossed?
In addition to aircraft safety a related point is the control of the airspace above
airports. An important aspect of this is the management of EU airspace as a
single entity, called the Single European Sky.
The Commission notes that:
“Aviation is a key driver of economic growth, employment and trade
and has a significant impact on the EU’s economy and the life and
mobility of its citizens. As such, it plays an important role in deliver-
ing on the Commission’s priorities, particularly ‘Jobs, Growth and
Investment’, ‘the EU as a Global Actor’ and ‘Energy Union’. As a
fundamental component of the aviation system, air traffic manage-
ment (ATM) and – specifically, the development and implementation
of the Single European Sky (SES) – makes an important contribution
in this context. It addresses challenges related to connectivity,
competitiveness, safety and the environment. ATM is an industrial
activity that ensures the safe separation of aircraft and the smooth
and orderly flow of air traffic. It involves many stakeholders, includ-
ing air navigation service and system providers, aircraft operators,
airports and the aeronautical manufacturing industry”19.
The airlines and the EU see that efficiencies can be achieved by better organised
management of the air and the European Commission in 2017 says in a note on
its Transport web pages:
“Since 2004, the European Union (EU) has gained competences in air
traffic management (ATM) and the decision-making process has moved
away from an intergovernmental practice to the EU framework. The
EU’s main objective is to reform ATM in Europe in order to cope with
sustained air traffic growth and operations under the safest, most cost-
and flight-efficient and environmentally friendly conditions. This
implies de-fragmenting the European airspace, reducing delays,
increasing safety standards and flight efficiency to reduce the aviation
environmental footprint, and reducing costs related to service provi-
sion. Achievements have already been made at operational, technolog-
19 Report from The Commission to The European Parliament and The Council on the implementation
and progress of the Single European Sky during the 2012-2014 period. Com (2015) 663 Final.
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ical and institutional levels; efforts are ongoing to maximise the benefits
of activities initiated under the SES framework…”
Although success in this venture is to be desired and can only be truly achieved
by a comprehensive system, progress is to date being made piecemeal and the
UK and the Republic of Ireland are working together on what they call the
Future Airspace Strategy (FAS) which was planned to come into operation by
2020.
The interconnectivity is recognised in the “Future of Airspace Strategy for the
United Kingdom 2011 to 2030” published by the Civil Aviation Authority 30
June 2011:
“The UK controlled airspace system is an integral part of the Euro-
pean ATM network and cannot operate in a vacuum. The FAS will
need to take full account of the relevance and impact of European
developments on this airspace and will need to facilitate alignment
and integration with key initiatives. In particular, the Strategy consid-
ers the alignment with the main strands of the Single European Sky
ATM Research (SESAR) programme, the development of Functional
Airspace Blocks (FAB), the Network Management Function and the
Single European Sky (SES) II Performance Regime as well as Euro-
pean Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) ATM rule-making. To allow for
effective implementation of the proposals led by the FAS, the UK
needs to understand the balance between decisions taken at a Euro-
pean level and those taken nationally, and the interactions between
the two. The FAS will form the national contribution to SESAR and
deliver SES II proposals. The key messages from the FAS within the
context of our engagement within wider European initiatives are:
while this is a national strategy it is written fully in the context of
emerging European and other international requirements and it is
entirely consistent with what are known to be emerging themes.”
Clearly at the time that this was produced the idea of the UK giving up its
membership of the EU was not even a possibility; it presumes unity and sees the
future of as being an integrated system. Brexit throws the reality of this into
doubt but does not undermine the validity of the argument that, as the Commis-
sion notes the Single European Sky: “[It] addresses challenges related to connec-
tivity, competitiveness, safety and the environment”, for these reasons there
should be uniformity.
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Norway and Switzerland have managed to join into the Single European Sky can
the UK achieve the same? Who provides the regulation might again prove to be
a stumbling block.
The issue of air safety presumes the existence of air travel itself. Without agree-
ment upon post Brexit air travel rights there may be no air travel to worry about.
This is an extreme position certainly but one that is the logical result of a hard
Brexit.
Before the Treaty of Rome in 1957 the idea of a Common Transport Policy with
a single market in transport was seen to be desirable as a method of delivering
the four “freedoms”, (i.e. of movement of goods, services, people and capital
and not to be confused with the “Freedoms” found in aviation law, more of
which later). However, possibly because of vested interest and internal pressure,
not all Member States were able or willing to give up control over transport. The
litigation in the European Court of Justice in 1983 between the European Parlia-
ment and the Council of Ministers where the former complained that the latter
was failing to implement its treaty obligations provided an impetus to the EU.
Air transport has changed dramatically in the last thirty or so. Low cost airlines
have revolutionised travel within the EU and arguably led to a greater sense of
cohesion by EU citizens. Those taking part in the UK Government’s Balance of
Competencies Review in 2014 were mainly of the opinion that the single avia-
tion market had removed restrictive trade and operating barriers and that this
had encouraged the development of the low-cost carriers. KLM may claim to be
the oldest airline still operating under its original name but Ryanair, a low-cost
carrier, which was only incorporated in 1984, is now (in terms of passengers)
the largest airline in the EU.
Airports Council International Europe (ACI Europe), the Brussels based Euro-
pean branch of the International Airports Association, which represents 500
airports in 45 European countries produces data on the number of air passen-
gers in Europe as a whole, (i.e. not just the EU). In a press release of data on the
8th May 2017 concerning its air traffic report for the first quarter of 2017
noting that passenger traffic at airports in Europe had grown by an average of
6.9% reported that the Director General of ACI Europe, Olivier Jankovec said:
“The momentum for traffic growth is holding on and it may well
continue to do so in the coming months. …. However, we need to be
cautious in our optimism given that the wider geopolitical environ-
ment remains more instable(sic) than ever. The on-going uncertainty
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over the implications of Brexit for aviation is unlikely to be resolved
quickly – and this might end-up limiting airline capacity growth and
network development opportunities for some airports, especially in
the UK.”
Scheduled international air travel on a commercial basis started in1919 and by
the 1940’s the question of legal rights to fly had been raised. The Chicago
Convention of 1944 set up the International Civil Aviation Organisation, (the
ICAO)20 which works with the airline industry and the 191 member States to
draw up and administer Standards and Recommended Practices to ensure air
safety. Member States must then ensure that airlines in their countries comply
with these standards. The convention further looked at the issues of the right or
otherwise to use the airspace over sovereign States and tried to provide solutions
albeit with only limited success. The convention is however one of the more
popular conventions; almost 200 countries have now ratified it.
The first articles of the convention set out where and to what aircraft the
convention applies:
Article 1 “The contracting States recognize that every State has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air-space above its terri-
tory.”
Article 2 “For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State
shall be deemed to be the land area and territorial waters adjacent
thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of
such State.”
Article 3 a) “This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft
and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.
Article 3 b) “Aircraft used in military, customs or police services shall
be deemed to be state aircraft.”
The convention introduced the idea of specific “freedoms”, initially there were
five but these have been extended to nine. However, the nine freedoms do not
apply universally. Only the first two freedoms have wide application. Two
multilateral agreements came out of the convention. These are, the Transit
Agreement and the Transport Agreement. The former provides for the exchange
between states of first and second freedom rights and has been widely adopted
(131 states have done so) while the latter provides for an exchange of all of the
20 An UN Agency.
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first five freedoms. However, only 11 countries have adopted this agreement.
Instead there is a worldwide network of bilateral agreements between countries
and sometimes between blocks of countries. A prime example of this latter situ-
ation is the EU-US Aviation Agreement, more commonly known as “Open
Skies”.
The full list of these “freedoms” is:
The first Freedom, which is sometimes referred to as the transit free-
dom, it is the freedom for an aircraft to fly over a foreign country
while on its way from its own home country to another country and
without any landing between its point of departure and point of desti-
nation.
The second Freedom is the freedom to land in a foreign country and
one that it is not its destination in order to refuel or for technical
reasons.
The third Freedom is the freedom to land passengers cargo and mail
carried from the aircraft’s country of origin.
The fourth Freedom is essentially the mirror image of the third Free-
dom in that it is the right to take passengers, cargo and mail from a
foreign country and land them in its own.
The fifth Freedom, is the freedom to land or take on passengers, cargo
or mail in a state which has a bilateral agreement with its home state
with these passengers, cargo or mail coming from or going to a third
state.
The sixth Freedom, allows an aircraft to carry passengers, goods and
mail between two foreign countries if travelling from its own country.
The seventh Freedom allows an aircraft operating outside its own
country to fly into another country and there take on set down
passengers, cargo or mail coming from or going to a third country.
The eighth Freedom is often referred to as “consecutive cabotage”
and it occurs where an aircraft leaves its own country and takes
passengers, goods and mail from one point in another country to
another point in that country.
The ninth Freedom is purely and simply cabotage, sometimes known
as “full cabotage” or “open skies” and is where an aircraft from one
country has the right to carry passengers, goods and mail from one
point in a foreign country to another point in that same country.
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In addition to these international convention concepts and rules there exists the
European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) to which the UK belongs along with
all other EU member states. A point to note is that the ECAA does not restrict
membership to EU states. Members include Norway, Iceland and some non-EU
Balkan states. Also, according to the EU Commission, there is an aspiration that
this should be further widened so as to include as many as 55 countries. There
are currently 36 members.
Any airline owned by a company that is EU based is able to fly without restric-
tion in any of the countries within the ECAA. When the UK finally leaves the
EU its membership of the ECCA will lapse. This will mean that UK owned
airlines will lose the benefit of access to the ECCA. They will no longer be
“Community carriers” under the provisions of EU Regulation 1008/2008. It is
true that an option for those airlines is to seek “nationality” of a remaining EU
member state by changing its ownership structure. This is easier said than done.
The airline would need to obtain an Air Operator Certificate, (an AOC) from
an EU member state and to get this it would need to show that it complied with
the EU requirement that:
Its principal place of business was within an EU State.
“Principal place of business” as defined by Regulation 1008/2008 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and Council on common rules for the operation of air services
in the Community (Recast) (Regulation 1008):
“…means the head office or registered office of a Community air
carrier in the Member State within which the principal financial func-
tions and operational control, including continued airworthiness
management, of the Community air carrier are exercised.”
This would damage the UK in terms of tax receipts, prestige and influence in the
aviation industry but it would also adversely affect the remaining EU members
and indeed the US. These are reciprocal rights and the UK leaving the ECAA
would also mean that EU and US flights would be unable to access UK airports.
EU airlines in particular will want access to London Heathrow and the high
volume of non-EU international flights that use that airport.
Without a new set of agreements, we would see a return to the position as it
stood previously i.e. a return to the previous framework of individually negoti-
ated bilateral agreements. We would argue that these have not been lost but
remained dormant when they were overtaken by the EU regime although there
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is not universal agreement on this view. However, even if they still exist they give
only partial help. In terms of the nine “Freedoms” the old systems might provide
for most aspects of third and fourth Freedoms but probably no more; the cabo-
tage freedoms would be particularly severely excluded.
If we assume that Brexit will actually happen then with it goes the integration
that has been so beneficial to the airlines, the citizens of the EU and the aspira-
tion to a cohesive Europe. Can integration be retained in a post Brexit Europe,
or in the absence of that something close to integration? The present satisfactory
position is based on three factors: shared legislation, the European Aviation
Safety Agency as a common regulator and recourse to a common court, which
will apply consistently the same rules.
So, leaving pure political advantage to one side (if that is ever possible) and
assuming that both the EU and the UK truly want to achieve a mutually benefi-
cial outcome, what are the possible options and do they come with difficulties
attached, and if so what are these?
Firstly, that the UK retains its membership of the ECCA.
Secondly, that the UK and the EU enter into a bilateral agreement.
Thirdly, would it be possible to negotiate an agreement similar in nature to the
“Open Skies” agreement that the EU presently has with the US?
All three offer possible solutions. If the UK were to retain its membership of
ECCA there would in effect be a maintenance of the status quo. It would require
the agreement of all remaining members and this might not be forthcoming.
Why would this be so? Norway has membership by virtue of its membership of
the European Economic Area (the EAA) and the EU Commission seems willing
to acknowledge expansion of ECCA and maintaining the size of the area will
surely be welcome? On the face of it this seems to be true. However, this will be
part of negotiations and in these circumstances the vested interests of each of the
members becomes important. As was the case with CETA where negotiations
were nearly derailed at the last moment. Members might indeed welcome the
entry into ECAA of countries that would make the grouping a bigger market.
The countries under consideration at present will add to potential passenger
numbers but offer little in the way of competition to the airlines already within
the ECCA. The position is not the same with the UK; it is true that the popula-
tion of the UK forms an attractive market but it is also true that the UK has large
developed airlines, including what some might say are aggressively competitive
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low-cost carriers? In the light of this perhaps the UK would not be welcomed in.
There is after all a history of protectionism in some EU states. Some might see
this as an opportunity for its airlines and so a reason to deny continued oppor-
tunity to UK competitors.
A further consideration might be the status of Gibraltar. The UK sees it as a
British Overseas Territory; Spain sees it as a part of Spain and denies that the
UK has any form of sovereignty over it. This might lead to opposition and the
exercise of a veto by Spain over legal agreements that imply that an airport on
Gibraltar is under UK control. This has the potential to upset all possible solu-
tions and not just this first one.
Yet another problem will be that ECCA membership will require the UK to be
subject to EU aviation law. This is a difficulty for the UK since it involves one of
those red lines which the Government says cannot be crossed. It is true that in
recent years such statements have been ignored but the British Prime Minister,
Mrs May will have great difficulty in domestic policy if she were to negotiate
away this issue.
Is it possible for some accommodation to be reached on joint regulation between
the ECJ and UK courts with difficulties being adjudicated by a neutral, interna-
tional body? There are precedents and this sort of solution has been achieved in
the past. However, existing arrangements for air travel disputes are not encour-
aging. Currently the EU and Switzerland have an agreement of this nature in the
Air Transport Agreement21
Article 21
1. A committee composed of representatives of the Contracting
Parties, to be known as the “Community/Switzerland Air Transport
Committee” (hereinafter referred to as the Joint Committee), is
hereby established which shall be responsible for the administration
of this Agreement and shall ensure its proper implementation. For this
purpose it shall make recommendations and take decisions in the
cases provided for in this Agreement. The decisions of the Joint
Committee shall be put into effect by the Contracting Parties in
accordance with their own rules. The Joint Committee shall act by
mutual agreement.
21 An Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport,
which came into force on the 1st of June 2002.
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Mutual agreement suggests flexibility; perhaps we are being too pessimistic and
an acceptable compromise between the UK and the EU is possible, but on closer
examination that expression “mutual agreement” might prove to be a sticking
point. What would happen in the event of a failure to reach such mutual agree-
ment and how would a decision then be achieved? The Agreement with Switzer-
land has no provision for a third party ruling by an umpire or international
body, clearly a potential problem and so it has proved to be.
The Agreement was tested in a dispute between Germany and Switzerland over
aircraft noise levels at Zurich Airport. This was a long running dispute but one
that intensified in 2003. Germany claimed that the proximity of Zurich Airport
caused excessive disturbance in Germany. Agreement between the two States
could not be achieved but even so a decision was made by the European
Commission. Switzerland did not agree and so the matter was referred to the
CJEU at both levels of the Court but notably was decided by the EU’s courts
without input from Switzerland. If the issue of the ECJ’s power continues to be
a red line for the UK then it could not accept a similar outcome applying to it in
the future.
It is self-evident that a supervisory single body has the merit of ensuring a single
approach and a comprehensive result. In this case using the single authority is
the ECJ. The UK Government has repeatedly made the point that an essential
reason for leaving the EU is so that it can reassert the supremacy of its courts. It
therefore seems that the UK will be unwilling, and probably will find it politi-
cally impossible to allow UK air transport to be subject to the ECJ. The White
Paper referred to above suggests that a negotiated independent international
tribunal comprised of members from, in this case the EU and the UK might
provide an acceptable compromise solution.
“We recognise that ensuring a fair and equitable implementation of
our future relationship with the EU requires provision for dispute
resolution. Dispute resolution mechanisms ensure that all parties
share a single understanding of an agreement, both in terms of inter-
pretation and application. These mechanisms can also ensure uniform
and fair enforcement of agreements.”
The White Paper points out that in the wider international context
“Dispute resolution mechanisms are also common in other interna-
tional agreements. Under the main dispute settlement procedure in
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the govern-
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ments concerned aim to resolve any potential disputes amicably, but
if that is not possible, there are expeditious and effective panel proce-
dures. Similarly, under the treaties establishing Mercosur,22 disputes
are in the first instance resolved politically, but otherwise the parties
can submit the dispute to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal. Decisions of
the tribunal may be appealed on a point of law to a Permanent
Review Tribunal Under the New Zealand-Korea Free Trade Agree-
ment, where the focus is also on cooperation and consultation to
reach a mutually satisfactory outcome. The agreement sets out a
process for the establishment of an arbitration panel. The parties
must comply with its findings and rulings, otherwise compensation
may be payable or the benefits of the FTA may be suspended.”
It also noted that:
“The UK already has a number of dispute resolution mechanisms in
its international arrangements. The same is true for the EU. Unlike
decisions made by the CJEU, dispute resolution in these agreements
does not have direct effect in UK law.”
It is clear that the dominance of its legal system is very important to both the EU
and the UK would both parties compromise? It is the case that the EU in its
recent trade deal with Canada does agree a compromise for dispute resolution.
The White paper again notes this:
“Such mechanisms are common in EU-Third Country agreements.
For example, the new EU-Canada Commercial Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) established a “CETA Joint Committee” to super-
vise the implementation and application of the agreement. Parties can
refer disputes to an ad hoc arbitration panel if necessary. The Joint
Committee can decide on interpretations that are binding on the
interpretation panels.”
And an annex to the White Paper provides several examples of dispute settle-
ment mechanism involving the EU.
The second possibility is the negotiation of bilateral agreements. There is a prec-
edent for this; as we noted above, Switzerland has such an agreement. It is not
as comprehensive as the first option. Switzerland has access to only seven of the
22 Mercosur is the South American customs union and free trading bloc.
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“Freedoms” of the air. This is still a workable solution but just not as attractive.
It would limit the routes that the UK based companies could fly, making them
less competitive and less financially secure. A bilateral agreement between the
UK and the EU is more likely than a series of separate agreements between the
UK and individual countries or groups of countries because questions of compe-
tence would arise; are individual countries competent to make such agreements
while remaining as EU members i.e. do they have the legal right to individually
negotiate agreements? We suggest that they do not.
The third possibility is a full-blown “Open Skies” agreement similar to that
existing between the EU and the US. There are practical problems here; if
continued membership of ECCA cannot be achieved how can even greater liber-
alisation be possible? Also, the question of safety standards and legal oversight
would again need to be answered.
The UK Government is presenting a show of confidence that economic self-
interest will triumph over any ill feeling at the UK’s departure.
In November 2016, the UK Secretary of State for Transport, the Secretary of
State for Exiting the EU and the Chief Executive of Airlines UK, (the body which
is the trade body of UK registered airlines), released a joint statement on air
transport issues:
“… we have the largest aviation network in Europe and the third
largest in the world, handling over 250 million passengers and 2.3
million tonnes of cargo last year. The UK has direct connections to
over 370 international destinations, more than any other EU country.
… Market access remains a top priority, and we want to make sure
we have liberal access to European aviation markets. We will also
work closely to explore new opportunities for further liberalisa-
tion.”23
This statement does make clear that there is ambition to seek to negotiate access
and also a hint that the UK does not see itself as a supplicant at the mercy of the
powerful but rather as a country that has economic power and one that if it were
to be excluded would not simply feel loss but would inflict loss on the wider EU.
It is worth noting in this regard that the UK benefits from participation in The
EU US Open Skies and would no longer do so when it leaves the EU. This agree-
23 More recent figures from the Civil Aviation Authority show that passenger numbers continue to rise
and that in 2016 all the five so called London Airports reported year-end figures to be greater for each
of them than in 2015 and that the total of all five for the year was 154,356,819.
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ment was hard won and is highly prized by both the EU and the US; the first
stage took seven years to achieve. Is it possible that the UK could negotiate
quickly a bi-party agreement with the US on Open Skies terms?
Alternatively, perhaps the US might not find the existing deal so attractive if its
partner, the EU, no longer included the UK. The opportunities presented to US
airlines to enter the UK market was clearly one of the attractions when the
agreement was being negotiated, since at that time the UK amounted to approx-
imately 40% of the air carriage between the US and the EU. Would they want
to continue on the same terms without the participation of UK? The remaining
27 states still represent a large market for the US and it would not make
economic sense to put this at risk, but will the current incumbent of the White
House see things that way?
Trains and boats and planes may still be going to Paris and Rome but the basis
on which they carry goods and passengers may change: Negotiations on the
issue of the UK’s access to the Single Open Sky look set to be interesting.
6. …wish and dreams come true…
To conclude, all the issues raised here could be resolved by goodwill and prag-
matism by the negotiating parties but inherent in this will be the need for
compromise. “Red lines” make compromise impossible. The UK will continue
to need young, talented or just simply willing workers to come into the country
and so while rejecting the free movement of such workers, they could still find
a welcome through a regulated system.
As for the role of the ECJ, this seems to us to be more difficult. It will be stum-
bling block. Dispute settlement will pose problems. The EU has shown that it
wants the ECJ to regulate agreements made between itself and other states. This
is the case in the case of the trade agreement with Norway. Is the UK in a
stronger position to achieve its aims than Norway? It is certainly a bigger econ-
omy and a bigger market and it is a country with a sophisticated intelligence
gathering facility and a large military force which it has used to support EU
activities such as convoy duties for shipping to protect against pirates in the
Horn of Africa. Would the EU wish to lose these things? On the other hand, if
accommodations are made for the UK there is the fear that the EU might start
to unravel so can the EU afford to concede these things?
If the UK were to accept the pre-eminence of the ECJ then a major reason for
Brexit would have been jettisoned and in that case the question would be raised;
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why leave? What of the possibility of some joint internationally supervised
tribunal to be constructed; could goodwill and pragmatism stretch this far? Is it
conceivable that the EU and the UK could reach a genuine compromise with
regard to regulatory security? Could some creative agreement give joint super-
visory power to both the ECJ and the Supreme Court of the UK? As we have
noted there are instances of such joint supervision albeit that they often seem not
to be robust enough. But perhaps with rigorous drafting now is the moment for
such an agreement to be devised.
What is the likelihood of success of these possible solutions? Politics will decide
to what extent it is that the negotiators have freedom for manoeuvre; if the UK
holds to its “red lines” and the EU to its insistence that it maintains all of the
“freedoms” and also the supremacy of the ECJ in legal decisions then none is
possible; a poor state of affairs for all concerned.
ANTHONY ROGERS
Senior Lecturer The City Law School, City, University of London
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